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Abstract Many health insurance schemes include deduc-
tibles to provide consumers with cost containment incen-
tives (CCI) and to counteract moral hazard. Policymakers
are faced with choices on the implementation of a specific
cost sharing design. One of the guiding principles in this
decision process could be which design leads to the
strongest CCI. Despite the vast amount of literature on the
effects of cost sharing, the relative effects of specific cost
sharing designs—e.g., a traditional deductible versus a
doughnut hole—will mostly be absent for a certain context.
This papers aims at developing a simulation model to
approximate the relative effects of different deductible
modalities on the CCI. We argue that the CCI depends on
the probability that healthcare expenses end up in the
deductible range and the expected healthcare expenses
given that they end up in the deductible range. Our
empirical application shows that different deductible
modalities result in different CCIs and that the CCI under a
certain modality differs across risk-groups.
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Introduction
There is a vast amount of literature on the effects of con-
sumer cost sharing on moral hazard [1, 13, 22]. The RAND
experiment, for example, has shown that a higher level of
cost sharing generally results in less moral hazard [12]. It is
therefore not surprising that most health insurance schemes
include cost sharing arrangements to provide consumers
with incentives for cost containment and counteract moral
hazard [2, 8, 14, 16, 21]. Policymakers are faced with
choices on the implementation of a specific cost sharing
design. Should, for example, a first-euro deductible1 (i.e.,
up to the deductible amount, insured are obliged to pay
100% of their healthcare expenses out-of-pocket in the
contract period, generally a calendar year) be favored
rather than a ‘doughnut hole’ (i.e., insured experience a gap
in coverage starting after they have incurred a fixed amount
of healthcare expenses)? In this case, policymakers decide
on the timing of onset of a deductible during the contract
period. Under a first-euro deductible, the timing is initial,
while under a ‘doughnut hole’ the timing of onset is
delayed, since individual healthcare expenses are required
before this modality comes into effect. One of the guiding
principles in this decision process on the cost sharing
design could be which specific cost sharing design is
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Despite the vast amount of literature on the effects of
cost sharing, the relative effects of specific cost sharing
designs will mostly be absent. In these situations, methods
to simulate incentives for cost containment under various
cost sharing designs may be helpful for policymakers to
underpin decisions on the design of effective consumer
cost sharing in health insurance. To the best of our
knowledge, such a method is not yet described in the lit-
erature. This paper focuses on the deductible as a cost
sharing mechanism and aims at developing a simulation
model to approximate the relative effects of different
deductible modalities on incentives for cost containment.
We simulate the individual’s cost containment incentives
(henceforth referred to as the CCI) as expected at the start
of the contract period, given the individual’s expected
healthcare expenses. We focus solely on the CCI at the
start of the insurance contract—rather than on the evolution
of the CCI during the contract period—since benefit design
decisions are usually made prior to the start of the insur-
ance contract. In addition to developing a simulation
method, we empirically illustrate this method for a first-
euro deductible and a doughnut hole.2 In this illustration
we will simulate average CCIs for the total population and,
separately, CCIs for groups of low-risk individuals and
high-risk individuals.
Our method is based on the classical economic theory
that consumers act like a homo economicus and possess
traits such as perfect self-interest, rationality, and infor-
mation. For the homo economicus the CCI is affected by
the marginal out-of-pocket expenses given the individual’s
expected spending in the contract period. We will argue
that these marginal out-of-pocket expenses depend on two
parameters. The first parameter is the probability that
individual healthcare expenses end up in the deductible
range. Ceteris paribus, the CCI is expected to decrease with
this probability. The explanation is that individuals will
hardly experience any incentives for cost-conscious
behavior when they expect their expenses to (far) exceed
the deductible range; any savings will reduce the insurance
claim, but not their out-of-pocket expenses [10, 12]. Given
that expenses of an individual end up in the deductible
range (hypothetically speaking), there is a second param-
eter of concern: the total expected expenses in the deduc-
tible range.3 The higher the total expected expenses—given
that they end up in the deductible range—the higher the
savings potential is, and the stronger the CCI will be.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next sec-
tion, the two deductible modalities under study are intro-
duced followed by a section inwhich the relevant parameters
for approximating the CCI are specified. The subsequent
section briefs about the conceptual framework to simulate
the CCI. Data and methods are described in the following
two sections. Results are presented before the concluding
section. Finally, conclusion and discussion are summarized.
Deductible modalities
In our conceptual model and empirical illustration we study
two deductible modalities applied in practice: (1) a first-
euro deductible and (2) a doughnut hole.
A first-euro deductible is the most commonly applied
deductible modality and implies that patients pay the first
€d of healthcare expenses out of their own pocket, before
the insurer takes over and reimburses all excess healthcare
expenses covered by the benefit package. The timing of
onset of this deductible is initial. In Fig. 1 expenses in the
interval [0, d] are borne by the insured, while expenses in
the interval [d, ?] are borne by the insurer. First-euro
deductibles can be, for example, found in the US, the
Netherlands and Switzerland.
A doughnut hole is a deductible that starts at a higher
level of healthcare expenses than €0. In contrast to a first-
euro deductible, the timing of onset of this deductible
modality is delayed, since individual healthcare expenses
are required before this modality comes into effect. A
‘doughnut hole’ can be seen as a ‘shifted’ deductible with a
uniform starting point. The latter means that the starting
point of the doughnut hole is fixed for all individuals and
set, for example, at the mean of actual healthcare expenses
in the population in the previous year. Figure 2 shows that
full coverage is provided for those expenses ranging from 0
to the starting point of the doughnut hole (interval [0, s]).
Then, insured enter the doughnut hole and experience a gap
in coverage. Healthcare expenses from the starting point of
the deductible s until the endpoint s ? d must be paid out-
of-pocket (interval [s, s ? d]). Full coverage is again
provided by the insurer if healthcare expenses exceed the
doughnut hole (interval [s ? d, ?]). An example of this
modality can be found in the Medicare drug coverage
system that was implemented in 2006 in the US (part D).
Incentives for cost containment: What are
the relevant parameters?
Our framework starts from the idea that consumers behave
rationally. Though this assumption is probably unrealistic
and over-simplistic, it provides a theoretical starting point
2 In this paper we do not pursue optimization of the deductible
design. We use designs from practice to illustrate the methodology to
simulate the CCI. Nevertheless, the framework can be used as a tool
to gain insight in the properties of other deductible modalities and
compare deductible designs in terms of the CCI.
3 Expected expenses are considered to be the total expected
healthcare expenses that fall under the basic benefit package.
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for the development of our framework. As we will discuss
in the end of this paper, we believe it is possible to extend
the framework with other assumptions on consumer
behavior that may follow from (future) empirical studies.
The central point of our framework is that for a perfectly
rational consumer the CCI in a deductible plan depends on
the marginal out-of-pocket expenses given the expected
spending in the contract period. More specifically, we will
argue that the CCI depends on (1) the probability that
individual healthcare expenses end up in the relevant
deductible range and (2) the total expected expenses given
that they end up in the relevant deductible range. The
relevant deductible range represents the interval where the
individual, instead of the insurer, bears the costs. In the
following two subsections we discuss these two parameters
in more depth.
The probability that individual healthcare expenses
end up in the relevant deductible range
Theory predicts that, in case of a first-euro deductible, the
price sensitivity of an individual is negatively correlated
with the probability that healthcare expenses exceed the
deductible amount, ceteris paribus [10, 12]. For a doughnut
hole, the price sensitivity of an individual is expected to be
negatively correlated with the probability that healthcare
expenses do not fall in the deductible range, keeping other
things equal. This principle can be illustrated by the fol-
lowing anecdotal example from Newhouse [14:81]: ‘Con-
sider a consumer on the Experiment plan with a 50%
coinsurance plan and a $1000 maximum dollar expenditure
(MDE). In any year, this person will have free care after
spending $2000 on healthcare services. Suppose the person
knows in advance that she will spend at least $2000; then
any additional care she decides to purchase today is, in
effect, free. Alternatively, suppose the person knows that
she will not spend as much as $2000; then any additional
care she decides to purchase today will cost 50 cents on the
dollar because she will not anticipate free care later in the
year.’ This example implies that a utility-maximizing
consumer uses the presenting price of a visit (i.e., the real
price) minus the product of the probability to exceed the
MDE and the presenting price to determine whether a visit
is worth its costs. This can be defined as the effective price
[12]. For example, if the probability of exceeding the
deductible amount is 0.25, the effective price for healthcare
to the insured of a €20 visit is €15 (€20 minus the product
of 0.25 and €20). The principle of varying effective prices
with the probability of having ‘free’ healthcare is shown in
Fig. 3.
The theory of effective prices suggests that, in some
cases, an individual perceives himself as completely
insured or completely uninsured and thus experiences a
weak or strong CCI. For example, if for a first-euro
deductible the probability that healthcare expenses exceed
the deductible amount approximates 0, the individual per-
ceives himself as completely uninsured and the effective
price equals the presenting price, which suggests a rela-
tively strong CCI. In contrast, if for a first-euro deductible
the probability that healthcare expenses exceed deductible
amount is close to 1, the individual perceives himself as
completely insured and the effective price is €0 which
implies a relatively weak CCI. In the latter case, cost-
conscious behavior will not prevent the individual from
reaching the maximum on out-of-pocket expenses
[12, 17, 18]. Under a first-euro deductible, an individual
thus perceives himself as completely uninsured if he knows
for sure—hypothetically speaking—that total healthcare
Fig. 1 Insurance under a first-
euro deductible with range [0,
d]
Fig. 2 Insurance under a
doughnut hole with range [s,
s ? d]
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expenses end up in the interval [0, d]. Under a doughnut
hole, this is the case if an individual knows for sure that
total healthcare expenses end up in the doughnut hole
(interval [s, s ? d]). In contrast, an individual perceives
himself as completely insured under a first-euro deductible,
if he knows for sure that total healthcare expenses will end
up in the interval [d,?]. Under a doughnut hole, this is the
case if the individual knows for sure that total expenses end
up in the intervals [0, s] or [s ? d, ?]. Though it is
unrealistic to assume that individuals know for sure whe-
ther or not healthcare expenses end up in a specific
deductible interval, the aforementioned examples illustrate
how the CCI depends on the probability to end up in the
deductible range.
Theoretically, the probability that an individual’s
healthcare expenses end up in the deductible range depends
on three parameters: (1) the amount of healthcare that is
already used in the contract period, (2) the number of days
remaining in the contract period, and (3) the expected
healthcare expenses for the remainder of the contract per-
iod [10]. Since we focus on the CCI at the start of the
contract period (and not on how the CCI evolves through
the contract) the first two parameters are not relevant here.4
This implies we will solely focus on the link between
expected spending and the CCI. In general, higher expected
spending at the start of the contract period implies a higher
probability to exceed the deductible.
The total expected expenses given that they end
up in the relevant deductible range
As discussed in the previous subsection, the probability
that healthcare expenses end up in the deductible range is
an important determinant in approximating the CCI. Nev-
ertheless, we argue it is not the only relevant parameter.
Consider the following hypothetical situation where two
individuals are subject to a first-euro deductible of €500.
Both individuals know with certainty that healthcare
expenses remain below this deductible amount.5 Assume
that person A has expected expenses in the deductible
range of €100 and person B has expected expenses in the
deductible range of €400. In this case, it would be inac-
curate to conclude that the CCIs for these individuals are
equal. In this specific case, B has a stronger CCI than A,
since the expected expenses for which the individual is
price sensitive due to the probability of not exceeding the
deductible are higher for B than for A. In other words, B
has a higher savings potential than A. Building on this
example, we state that the expected healthcare expenses
given that they end up in the deductible range is a relevant
parameter for the CCI too.
A method to simulate incentives for cost
containment
In this section we build a conceptual framework to simulate
the CCI under different deductible modalities at the start of
the contract period. We describe our method for a first-euro
deductible and a doughnut hole.
First-euro deductible
Under a first-euro deductible, the deductible range where
the individual bears the costs equals [0, d]. Accordingly,
the CCI under a first-euro deductible can be simulated by
combining the probability P that individual healthcare
expenses Y remain below the deductible amount d and the
expected expenses E(Y) given that expenses Y remain
below the deductible amount d:
CCIfirsteuro deductible ¼ P Y\dð Þ  EðY jY\dÞ: ð1Þ
The essence of the CCI can be graphically illustrated
with Fig. 4. Consider the curve in Fig. 4 to represent the
probability of an individual’s healthcare expenses to
Fig. 3 Presenting price versus effective price under a deductible
(P probability, Y healthcare expenses, d deductible amount)
4 Nevertheless, the conceptual framework can be refined to facilitate
simulation of the CCI during the contract period. By determining the
CCI on multiple moments (i.e., by repeating the procedure that is
described in this paper), the other two parameters can be taken into
account.
5 Or: both individuals have an equal probability that healthcare
expenses exceed the deductible amount [i.e., P(Y\ d)\ 1].
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remain below amount x. For an infinite value of x, this
probability equals 1, which means that all expenses are in
the interval [0, x]. In this extreme case E(Y|Y\ x) equals
E(Y) and the outcome of Eq. (1) exactly represents the total
area above the curve. This is no longer true, however, when
P(Y\ x) is smaller than 1, which is the case for
x = d. Since P(Y\ d) is smaller than 1 and E(Y|Y\ d) is
smaller than E(Y), the outcome of Eq. (1) no longer rep-
resents the total area above the curve, but shrinks to the
shaded area. Here we come to the essence of our method:
when the shaded area of deductible modality A is larger
than that of deductible modality B, the CCI is expected to
be stronger under modality A than under modality B.
Doughnut hole
Under a doughnut hole, the endpoint of the deductible
range is marked by s ? d. P(Y\ s ? d) and
E(Y|Y\ s ? d) are higher compared to P(Y\ d) and
E(Y|Y\ d) under a first-euro deductible with deductible
amount d. Consequently, the CCI for the interval [0, s ? d]
will be stronger than the CCI for the interval [0, d]. It is
incorrect, however, to assume that the CCI under a
doughnut hole equals the CCI for the complete interval [0,
s ? d]. This can be illustrated with an infinite value for s:
here both P(Y\ s ? d) and P(Y\ s) equal 1. In this case it
would be inaccurate to conclude that the CCI equals
P(Y\ s ? d) * E(Y|Y\ s ? d), since all expenses are in
the interval [0, s] and are fully reimbursed by the insurer. In
other words, no expenses appear in the interval [s,
s ? d] where the individual bears the costs. So, we argue
that, in this specific example, the CCI should equal 0 and,
in general, the negative effect of interval [0, s] on the CCI
should be incorporated in the calculation of the CCI. The
latter implies that when determining the CCI under a
doughnut hole, the focus should be on the expenses where
the insured are price sensitive due to the probability of
entering the doughnut hole but not reaching the endpoint of
the doughnut hole.
This reasoning implies that the CCI under a doughnut
hole can be approximated by the product of P(Y\ s ? d)
and E(Y|Y\ s ? d) minus the product of P(Y\ s) and
E(Y|Y\ s). Accordingly, the CCI under a doughnut hole
can be calculated by Eq. (2).
CCIdoughnut hole ¼ P Y\sþ dð Þ  E Y jY\sþ dð Þ½ 
 P Y\sð Þ  E Y jY\sð Þ½ : ð2Þ
This procedure is graphically illustrated in Fig. 5 where
the shaded area in panel I represents P(Y\ s ? d)
* E(Y|Y\ s ? d), the shaded area in panel II represents
P(Y\ s) * E(Y|Y\ s), and the shaded area in panel III
represents the outcome of Eq. (2).
Data
For the empirical application of our method we used
administrative data from Dutch insurers operating under
the Health Insurance Act. We used a sample of 500,000
individuals who were randomly selected from the total
Dutch population of 18 years and older and enrolled in the
basic health insurance for a complete calendar year (2011).
The sample is similar to the total Dutch population
regarding mean, standard deviation, minimum, and
maximum.
The dataset includes individual-level risk-information
on healthcare expenses and risk-characteristics. The risk-
characteristics are age-gender classes, diagnoses cost
groups (DCGs), pharmacy-based cost groups (PCGs), high
cost groups (HCGs) and multiple prior years high costs
(MHCs). In the Netherlands this information is used in the
Dutch risk-equalization system. Further information on
these risk characteristics can be found in previous work
(see, for example, [19]). In addition to information on risk-
characteristics, the dataset includes information on total
healthcare expenses in 2011 that are covered by the Dutch
basic health insurance (e.g., costs for general practitioner
care, hospital care, pharmaceutical care and mental care).
Based on visual inspection, we excluded 10 insured with
extremely high healthcare expenses ranging from €223,184
till €467,722 from the full sample of 500,000 insured,
because they appeared to negatively affect our expenditure
model. On average in the selected sample of 499,990
Fig. 4 CCI under a first-euro deductible
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individuals, the actual healthcare expenses were €2257
with a standard deviation of €6124, a minimum of €1, a
median of €593 and a maximum of €217,566.
Methods
To empirically illustrate our method for simulating the CCI
under different deductible modalities we follow a four-step
procedure:
1. Estimate an expenditure model;
2. Approximate the probability that healthcare expenses
end up in the deductible range;
3. Approximate the expected expenses given that they
end up in the deductible range;
4. Simulate the CCI.
In this paper we are interested in the CCI under a
specific deductible modality relative to others; absolute
figures of the CCI are of little significance. Empirical
results are intended as an illustration of the method
developed. First, we derive the CCI under a first-euro
deductible of €500, €1000, €2000, €3000, €4000, €5000
and €10,000 in order to examine the effects of the deduc-
tible amount. After that, we examine the CCI under a
doughnut hole of €1000 with a uniform starting point at
€500, €1000, €2000, €2257 (i.e., the mean of actual
healthcare expenses in the selected sample of 499,990
individuals), €3000, €4000 and €5000 in order to compare
the CCI between a first-euro deductible and a doughnut
hole. Average CCIs under the two deductible modalities
are simulated for the full sample, and separately, for a
group of high-risk individuals and the complementary
group of low-risk individuals. Morbidity information is
used to determine to which risk-group an individual
belongs: those individuals with (without) a DCG, PCG,
HCG and/or MHC are considered as a high-risk individual
(low-risk individual). In this sample 72% is considered as a
low-risk individual and 28% as a high-risk individual.
It is important to mention that—next to the assumption
on rational behavior—our concept is based on some other
(implicit) assumptions. For example, we assume a linear
relationship between the probability that healthcare
expenses end up in the deductible range and the CCI.
Furthermore, we focus on the CCI regarding total health-
care utilization that is subject to the deductible and neglect
the composition of the care that is used. The implications
of these and other assumptions, will be discussed in the last
section of this paper.
Estimate an expenditure model
First, to predict expected healthcare expenses E(Y) for each
individual, an expenditure model is estimated with actual
expenses in 2011 as dependent variable and age-gender
classes, DCGs, PCGs, HCGs and MHCs as explanatory
variables. We opted for a Generalized Linear Model
(GLM) with a gamma distribution and a log-link function,
which is considered to be an appropriate statistical method
for modelling healthcare expenses in many studies (see, for
example, [3, 5, 7, 11, 17]). Basically, all risk characteristics
are statistically significant at the conventional level (given
the large sample size). On average the expected healthcare
expenses were €2537 with a standard deviation of €7762,
and the R2 of the model is 0.39. In the subsequent tables we
show that our estimation approach provides an accept-
able fit between the actual and predicted parameters of the
CCI.6
Fig. 5 The CCI under a doughnut hole
6 We also took into consideration other specifications of the model
varying in terms of distribution and link-function. We opted for a
GLM with a gamma distribution and a log-link function based on a
comparison of mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum and
mean absolute predicted error of actual and expected expenses in the
sample and per expenditure quintile.
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Approximate the probabilities that healthcare
expenses end up in the deductible range
After estimating an expenditure model, the probability P
that healthcare expenses Y remain below deductible
amount d, starting point s and endpoint s ? d is approxi-
mated. We follow the procedure as described by van Kleef
and colleagues [17], who have identified the relevant
parameters given the use of a gamma distribution with a
log-link. The probabilities that we are interested in can be
derived by Eqs. (3) till (5).
P Y\dð Þ ¼ C cd; kð Þ; ð3Þ
P Y\sð Þ ¼ C cs; kð Þ; ð4Þ
P Y\sþ dð Þ ¼ C csþd; kð Þ; ð5Þ
where C(.) is the cumulative density function of the gamma
distribution, the scale parameter k is 0.4969, and:
k ¼ k=EðYÞ; ð6Þ
cd ¼ d  k; ð7Þ
cs ¼ s  k; ð8Þ
csþd ¼ ðsþ dÞ  k: ð9Þ
Given the assumptions made and given our dataset, we
check whether the results based on Formulae (3) till (9) are
in line with the actual figures in the sample; the proportion
q and probability P that healthcare expenses Y remain the
deductible amount d under a first-euro deductible are
compared. Table 1 shows that q(Y\ d) and P(Y\ d) fol-
low the same pattern, specifically in case of a relatively
high deductible amount.
Approximate the expected expenses given that they
end up in the deductible range
Given expected expenses E(Y) and the parameters calcu-
lated in the previous step, expected expenses given that
expenses end up in the interval [0, d], [0, s], respectively
[0, s ? d] can be calculated by Eqs. (10), (11) and (12)
[17].
E Y jY\dð Þ ¼ E Yð Þ  C cd; k þ 1ð Þ=Cðcd; kÞ; ð10Þ
E Y jY\sð Þ ¼ E Yð Þ  C cs; k þ 1ð Þ=Cðcs; kÞ; ð11Þ
E Y jY\sþ dð Þ ¼ E Yð Þ  C csþd; k þ 1ð Þ=Cðcsþd; kÞ: ð12Þ
Table 2 shows the actual expenses and expected
expenses given that expenses remain below first-euro
deductible amount d. Our approach somewhat underesti-
mates these expenses for the relatively small first-euro
deductibles and somewhat overestimates them for the
higher ones, but these deviations do not seem important.
Based on the results presented in Tables 1 and 2, there
seems to be no reason to believe that the overestimations of
the mean and the standard deviation of expected healthcare
expenses compared to the actual healthcare expenses have
unacceptable effects on the key parameters of interest in
this paper.
Simulate the CCI
As discussed in section ‘‘A method to simulate incentives for
cost containment’’, the CCI is conceptualized as a product of
the probability that individual healthcare expenses end up in
the deductible range and the expected expenses given that they
end up in the deductible range. Therefore, parameters
obtained in step 2 and step 3 are combined in order to deter-
mine the CCI for each individual. The CCI under a first-euro
deductible with deductible amount d is calculated by Eq. (1).
The CCI under a doughnut hole with starting point s and
deductible amount d is approximated by Eq. (2). The CCI is
presented in Euros and can be interpreted as the marginal
amount of healthcare expenses for which a consumer is fully
price sensitive. Hypothetically speaking, the CCI will be zero
for a consumer who knows for sure his spending will exceed
the deductible amount. For a consumerwho knows for sure his
spending will not exceed the deductible amount, the CCI will
equal his expected spending.
Implications
At least three implications arise from the conceptual
framework as described in section ‘‘A method to simulate
incentives for cost containment’’. These hypotheses are to
be addressed in ‘‘Results’’ where the simulation results are
presented. First, the CCI under a deductible increases when
the deductible amount increases. If, ceteris paribus, the
deductible amount increases (i.e., point d and, accordingly,
point s ? d is shifted to the right), the deductible range is
broadened. As a result, both the probability that expenses
end up in the deductible range and the expected expenses in
Table 1 Proportions q and
probabilities P that healthcare
expenses Y remain below
various deductible amounts
d for the full sample





Table 2 Mean of actual
expenses Y and expected
expenses E(Y) given that
expenses Y remain below vari-
ous deductible amounts d for the
full sample
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the deductible range once they ended up in the deductible
interval are expected to increase. This will result in a
stronger CCI.
Second, we expect that different deductible modalities
lead to different CCIs. Shifting the deductible influences
the CCI. The direction of the effect is an interesting
empirical question. On the one hand, a shift of the
deductible to higher expenditure levels reduces the proba-
bility to reach the deductible range, which negatively
affects the CCI. On the other hand, such a shift increases
the expected expenses given that they end up in this range,
which positively affects the CCI.
Third, we hypothesize that the CCI under a first-euro
deductible and a doughnut hole will differ across risk-
groups. Figure 6 shows P(Y\ x) of a relatively low-risk
individual under a first-euro deductible (left panel) and
under a doughnut hole with a starting point at the mean of
actual healthcare expenses in the population (right panel).
E(Y) for this healthy individual are relatively low, but there
is always a certain level of uncertainty whether or not this
individual needs care. This implies that, under a first-euro
deductible, there is a low probability that healthcare
expenses exceed the deductible amount. In contrast, under
a doughnut hole with a starting point at the mean of
healthcare expenses, it is not very likely that this low-risk
individual ends up in the doughnut hole. P(Y\ s) and
P(Y\ s ? d) both approximate 1. As a result of the rela-
tively high P(Y\ d) under a first-euro deductible com-
pared to P(s\ Y\ s ? d) under a doughnut hole, the CCI
for this low-risk individual is relatively strong in case of a
first-euro deductible in comparison to a doughnut hole.
Now consider a relatively high-risk individual, such as a
chronically ill patient. P(Y\ x) is depicted in Fig. 7.
E(Y) for this relatively unhealthy individual are above
average. Accordingly, under a first-euro deductible,
P(Y\ d) is low (Fig. 7, left panel). In contrast, P(s\ Y\
s ? d) is relatively high when the starting point of the
doughnut hole is set at the mean of actual healthcare
expenses (Fig. 7, right panel). Consequently, for this high-
risk individual the CCI is relatively strong in case of a
doughnut hole in comparison to a first-euro deductible.
The previous consideration implies that, at the popu-
lation level, it is not obvious whether a first-euro
deductible leads to a stronger or weaker CCI than a
doughnut hole. On the one hand, a shift of the starting
point of the deductible to a higher expenditure level than
€0 may increase the CCI for the high-risk individuals (a
relatively small group with relatively high savings
potential). On the other hand, such a shift may decrease
the CCI for the low-risk individuals (a relatively large
group with relatively low savings potential). In our
empirical illustration we aim to simulate the net outcome
of these two effects.
Results
As an illustration of the method developed, this section
presents the empirical results for a first-euro deductible and
a doughnut hole. Results are shown for the full sample and
also separately for a group of high-risk individuals and the
complementary group of low-risk individuals.
Fig. 6 The CCI for a low-risk individual under a first-euro deductible (left panel) and under a doughnut hole with a starting point at the mean of
actual healthcare expenses in the population (right panel)
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Full sample
In Table 3 the results are presented for a first-euro deductible
of various deductible amounts for the total sample. The mean
probability that healthcare expenses remain below the deduc-
tible amount, the expected expenses given that they remain
below the deductible amount, and the product of these two
parameters are shown. As hypothesized in subsection ‘‘Im-
plications’’, Table 3 reveals that an increase in the deductible
amount indeed leads to a higher P(Y\d) and higher
E(Y|Y\ d). Thus, the higher the deductible amount is, the
stronger the CCI will be. Note that this conclusion also holds
for a doughnut hole, as P(s\Y\ s ? d) and
E(Y|s\Y\ s ? d) increasewith a higher deductible amount.
Table 4 shows (the relevant parameters for determining)
the CCI under a doughnut hole of €1000 with various starting
points (the CCI under a doughnut hole assuming other
deductible amounts is shown in the Appendix). The mean
probability that healthcare expenses remain below the starting
point, respectively the endpoint of the deductible, the expec-
ted expenses given that they end up in the interval [0, s],
respectively [0, s ? d] and the CCI are shown. Table 4 shows
that P(Y\ s) is lower compared to P(Y\ s ? d). Similarly,
E(Y|Y\ s) are lower compared to E(Y|Y\ s ? d). Second,
results suggest that the CCI under a doughnut hole with
deductible amount €1000 increases when the starting point of
the doughnut hole is shifted to the right until a starting point of
€1000 is used. On average, a stronger CCI is realized under a
doughnut hole with a starting point at €1000 compared to a
starting point at the mean of actual healthcare expenses in the
sample (i.e., 2257). These results imply that, given the dataset
and the assumptions made, the ‘sweet spot’ of the starting
point is located somewhere around €1000. This finding might
suggest that the starting point of the doughnut hole should be
located below the overall mean of actual healthcare expenses,
implying that the starting point of the doughnut hole in the
Medicare drug coverage system should be lowered, since it is
currently set at the overallmeanof actual healthcare expenses.
A comparison of the results under a first-euro deductible
with those under a doughnut hole suggests that different
deductible modalities lead to differences in CCIs. Assum-
ing a deductible amount of €1000, a doughnut hole with a
relatively low starting point leads on average to a stronger
CCI compared to a first-euro deductible. For example, a
first-euro deductible of €1000 leads to a CCI of €171 while
a doughnut hole of €1000 with a starting point at €1000,
respectively at the mean of actual healthcare expenses
Fig. 7 The CCI for a high-risk individual under a first-euro deductible (left panel) and under a doughnut hole with a starting point at the mean of
actual healthcare expenses (right panel)
Table 3 The CCI under a first-euro deductible of various deductible
amounts d for the full sample
d P(Y\ d)a E(Y|Y\ d)b CCI
500 0.43 158 68
1000 0.57 302 171
2000 0.73 551 393
3000 0.81 755 598
4000 0.86 921 773
5000 0.89 1059 920
10,000 0.96 1475 1371
a The probability that healthcare expenses remain below the deduc-
tible amount
b The expected expenses given that they remain below the deductible
amount
A method to simulate incentives for cost containment under various cost sharing designs: an…
123
leads to a CCI of €222, respectively €197. Results suggest
that this pattern in favor of a doughnut hole reverses (and
the CCI will be stronger in case of a first-euro deductible)
when the starting point of the doughnut hole is located
somewhere between €3000 and €4000.
Low-risk individuals and high-risk individuals
Table 5 provides the CCI under a first-euro deductible
specifically for the low-risk individuals and the high-risk
individuals. For the high-risk individuals P(Y\ d) is lower
while E(Y|Y\ d) are higher in comparison to the low-risk
individuals. Under a first-euro deductible, the CCI is
strongest for the low-risk individuals compared to the high-
risk individuals, as long as the deductible amount is rela-
tively low; when the deductible amount is set somewhere
between €4000 and €5000, this pattern is reversed.
The CCI under a doughnut hole of €1000 with various
starting points is shown inTable 6 for the two risk-groups. The
CCI under a doughnut hole is stronger for the high-risk indi-
viduals than for the low-risk individuals, as long as the starting
point of the deductible is shifted to the right considerably. If the
starting point is set at a relatively low point (i.e., at €500 or at
€1000), the CCI under a doughnut hole is stronger for the low-
risk individuals. For the low-risk individuals, the ‘sweet spot’
of the starting point seems to be located somewhere around
€1000 while for the high-risk individuals this is somewhere
around the overall mean of actual healthcare expenses.
A comparison of the CCI under the two deductible
modalities shows that, given our dataset and under the
assumptions made in this research, for the low-risk indi-
viduals, a doughnut hole on average leads to a stronger CCI
compared to a first-euro deductible until a starting point of
€3000 or more is chosen. For example, the CCI under a
doughnut hole with a starting point at €1000 is €231
compared to the CCI of €187 under a first-euro deductible.
Nevertheless, only small differences exist when comparing
a first-euro deductible to a doughnut hole with a starting
point at the mean of actual healthcare expenses; the CCI
equals €187 compared to €189. For the high-risk individ-
uals the CCI is noticeably stronger under a doughnut hole
compared to a first-euro deductible, even if the starting
point is shifted to the right only moderately. The CCI is, for
instance, €177 under a doughnut hole with a starting point
at €500 compared to €130 under a first-euro deductible.
Table 4 The CCI under a
doughnut hole with deductible
amount d €1000 with various
starting points s for the full
sample
s P(Y\ s)a P(Y\ s ? d)b E(Y|Y\ s)c E(Y|Y\ s ? d)d CCI
0e 0 0.57 0 302 171
500 0.43 0.66 158 433 215
1000 0.57 0.73 302 551 222
2000 0.73 0.81 551 755 204
2257 0.75 0.82 607 801 197
3000 0.81 0.86 755 921 175
4000 0.86 0.89 921 1059 147
5000 0.89 0.92 1058 1173 123
a The probability that healthcare expenses remain below the starting point of the deductible
b The probability that healthcare expenses remain below the endpoint of the deductible
c The expected expenses given that they end up in the interval [0, s]
d The expected expenses given that they end up in the interval [0, s ? d]
e A doughnut hole with a starting point of €0 is effectively a first-euro deductible; the CCI and related
probabilities and expected expenses are identical (see Table 3)
Table 5 The CCI under a first-euro deductible of various deductible
amounts d for the low-risk individuals and the high risk individuals
d P(Y\ d)a E(Y|Y\ d)b CCI
Low-risk individuals
500 0.48 157 75
1000 0.63 296 187
2000 0.79 529 418
3000 0.88 709 617
4000 0.92 846 776
5000 0.95 952 899
10,000 0.99 1199 1188
High-risk individuals
500 0.30 162 48
1000 0.41 318 130
2000 0.55 609 329
3000 0.64 875 547
4000 0.70 1119 765
5000 0.75 1341 976
10,000 0.87 2203 1853
a The probability that healthcare expenses remain below the deduc-
tible amount
b The expected expenses given that they remain below the deductible
amount
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Results suggest that for the high-risk individuals, a
doughnut hole with a starting point at the mean of actual
expenditures leads to a stronger CCI compared to a first-
euro deductible (€219 compared to €130).
Conclusion and discussion
Starting from the traditional economic theory that con-
sumers act like a homo economicus, this paper has devel-
oped a method to simulate Cost Containment Incentives
(CCI) under different deductible modalities. For a homo
economicus the CCI depends on two parameters: (1) the
probability that individual healthcare expenses end up in
the deductible range and (2) the total expected healthcare
expenses given that they end up in the deductible range.
We have empirically illustrated the method for two
modalities applied in practice, i.e., a first-euro deductible
and a doughnut hole. Given our dataset and under the
assumptions made, our findings lead to four conclusions.
First, not surprisingly, the CCI increases with the
deductible amount, ceteris paribus. The developed method
can be used to simulate the impact of a higher deductible
on the CCI. Second, the CCI differs between deductible
modalities. Which deductible modality is opted for by
policymakers seems to have consequences in terms of the
CCI and it can thus be valuable to take the CCI into con-
sideration when comparing the effectiveness of these dif-
ferent deductible designs. In our sample, a doughnut hole
with a well-chosen starting point (i.e., below €4000) on
average provides a stronger CCI than a first-euro deduc-
tible. This would imply that, to realize a strong CCI, the
starting point of the deductible should be higher than zero
for all insured. This finding is in line with the conclusion of
van Kleef and coauthors [17]. Third, the CCI differs across
risk-groups. We have found that under a first-euro deduc-
tible the CCI is strongest for the low-risk individuals, as
long as the deductible amount is relatively low (i.e., until
the deductible amount is set somewhere between €4000
and €5000). Under a doughnut hole, the CCI is strongest
for the high-risk individuals, as long as the starting point is
higher than €1000. Our findings suggest that the CCI is
stronger under a doughnut hole than under a first-euro
deductible for both the low-risk individuals—at least when
a starting point below €3000 is chosen—and for the high-
risk individuals. Fourth, our results suggest that, in order to
provide a stronger CCI, the starting point of the doughnut
hole should not be located at the mean of actual healthcare
expenses in the sample, but somewhere below that mean.
This finding suggests that the CCI under the doughnut hole
in the Medicare drug coverage system could be increased
by lowering the starting point.
Table 6 The CCI under a
doughnut hole with deductible
amount d €1000 with various
starting points s for the low-risk
individuals and the high risk
individuals
s P(Y\ s)a P(Y\ s ? d)b E(Y|Y\ s)c E(Y|Y\ s ? d)d CCI
Low-risk individuals
0e 0 0.63 0 296 187
500 0.48 0.73 157 420 230
1000 0.63 0.79 296 529 231
2000 0.79 0.88 529 709 199
2257 0.82 0.89 580 748 189
3000 0.88 0.92 709 846 159
4000 0.92 0.95 846 952 123
5000 0.95 0.97 952 1031 94
High-risk individuals
0e 0 0.41 0 318 130
500 0.30 0.49 162 467 177
1000 0.41 0.55 318 609 200
2000 0.55 0.64 609 875 218
2257 0.57 0.65 680 940 219
3000 0.64 0.70 875 1119 218
4000 0.70 0.75 1119 1341 211
5000 0.75 0.78 1341 1545 200
a The probability that healthcare expenses remain below the starting point of the deductible
b The probability that healthcare expenses remain below the endpoint of the deductible
c The expected expenses given that they end up in the interval [0, s]
d The expected expenses given that they end up in the interval [0, s ? d]
e A doughnut hole with a starting point of €0 is effectively a first-euro deductible; the CCI and related
probabilities and expected expenses are identical (see Table 5)
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It is important to note that our empirical findings depend on
several assumptions which deserve further elaboration. In
addition,many important topics remain for future research. Six
of these issues are discussed below. First, a note of caution
should be raised against the assumption of individuals
behaving completely rationally, since in practice, insured
might actually act differently than the classical theory sug-
gests. First, there is empirical evidence that individuals tend to
overestimate small probabilities and underestimate large
probabilities [9:279, 20]. This may have consequences for the
first parameter in our framework (i.e., the probability that
healthcare expenses fall in the deductible range). For example:
if a low-risk individual under a first-euro deductible would
overestimate the probability of becoming ill, this individual’s
perceived probability that healthcare expenses remain below
the deductible amount decreases, leading to a weaker CCI.
Second, Brot-Goldberg et al. [6] show that, in practice, con-
sumer behavior departures from fully rational behavior in that
sense that individuals seem to act in a myopic way. In partic-
ular, they show that in the decision of using healthcare, indi-
viduals are not responsive to the expected marginal end-of-
year price but often respond to easier to understand prices such
as spot prices or their prior end-of- year marginal price. This
evidence suggests that the second parameter of our framework
(i.e., the total expected expenses in the deductible range)might
be influenced. Although there is growing empirical evidence
on alternative assumptions concerning consumer behavior,
there is limited research on how these ‘new’ assumptions
should be incorporated in economic simulation studies. It is yet
unclear how these insights exactly translate into our simulation
framework. For instance, it would be interesting to study how
our framework could be extended with weights or additional
parameters to incorporate new insights.
Second, in this paper a linear relation between the
probability of exceeding the deductible and the CCI is
assumed. If there are reasons to believe that an alternative
relationship is more realistic, it is possible to interchange
the assumption of linearity and plug-in any other rela-
tionship in the conceptual framework.
Third, the expected healthcare expenses are an important
parameter in the approximation of the CCI. The expenditure
model based on age-gender classes, DCGs, PCGs, HCGs and
MHCs probably predicts expenses less than perfectly.
Therefore, obtained results cannot expected to be perfect
either. Overestimated expected expenses might explain
why—in contrast to what we hypothesized—a doughnut
hole instead of a first-euro deductible leads to the strongest
CCI for the low-risk individuals. Further research is needed
to simulate the CCI with better prediction models. Signifi-
cantly better predictions can be expected if expenses in
previous years are added to the model, since previous
expenses proved to be a strong predictor for future expenses,
even when the abovementioned predictors are already
included [4, 19]. A better predictionmodel will likely lead to
a larger variance in expected expenses and larger differences
in the CCI across risk groups.
Fourth, for reasons of simplicity we did not incorporate a
correction for the moral hazard effect. In our empirical illus-
trationweapply a substantially higher deductible amount (i.e.,
€1000) than the amount originally applied in our data (i.e.,
€170). If the higher deductible amount was implemented in
practice this would have led to less moral hazard and thus
lower healthcare expenses. An interesting question is whether
or not consumers include the ‘moral hazard effect’ in their
expectations about future healthcare expenses. If they do (e.g.,
by expecting lower healthcare expenses in case of a higher
deductible amount) this effect should ideally be incorporated
in the type of simulations applied in this paper. This would be
possible by modifying the healthcare expenses on which the
expenditure model is based.
Fifth, different cost sharing designs are expected to have
different implications in terms of solidarity. For example,
for the high-risk individuals, a first-euro deductible can be
considered as socially inequitable (assuming insufficient
financial compensation), because these individuals incur,
on average, higher out-of-pocket expenses than their
healthy counterparts. In addition, for these high-risk indi-
viduals, a first-euro deductible can be considered as inef-
fective in reducing moral hazard, because these individuals
know ex-ante that their yearly healthcare expenses will
exceed the deductible amount. The relation between dif-
ferent cost sharing designs and solidarity and to what
extent a stronger CCI has an effect on moral hazard
reduction might benefit from future research.
Sixth, in this paper only two deductible modalities are
empirically illustrated. The method developed allows
approximationof theCCIunder other deductiblemodalities as
well. Examples of other modalities are a doughnut hole with a
risk-adjusted starting point and an income-related deductible.
Under a doughnut hole with a risk-adjusted starting point (as
proposed in the literature by vanKleef et al. [17]), the location
of the doughnut hole depends on specific individual risk-
characteristics of the insured, such as demographics, diag-
nostics or prior healthcare utilization. The starting point could
be, for example, based on maximized uncertainty in out-of-
pocket expenses or on a maximized CCI. It is expected that a
doughnut hole with a risk-adjusted starting point leads to a
stronger CCI than a first-euro deductible and a uniform
doughnut hole. In addition to the possibility to simulate the
CCI under other deductible modalities, the method provides
the opportunity to determine theCCIunder other forms of cost
sharing than deductibles, such as co-insurance (i.e., insured
are obliged to pay a percentage of the healthcare expenses per
service out-of-pocket) or co-payments (i.e., insured are
required to pay a predefined amount per service out-of-
pocket). Thismight be an interesting topic for future research.
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Last, we acknowledge that the CCI may be regarded as
one of the multiple criteria that can be taken into consid-
eration by policymakers when deciding on the design of
effective consumer cost sharing in health insurance. Other
criteria, such as the practical and political-ideological
aspects of different deductible modalities could be relevant
as well. For example, an important aspect in the deductible
design decision would be the trade-off between a stronger
CCI versus transparency and simplicity. Specifically, in a
system with a doughnut hole where the starting point of the
deductible depends on individual risk-characteristics, the
average CCI might be higher compared to a first-euro
deductible, but transparency may be worse when the
majority of insured does not understand how and why
certain starting points are assigned to them. Consequently,
acceptance of the deductible system might be in danger.
Another issue would be how policymakers will try to level
the government’s cash flow. Switching to a deductible
system where a relatively strong CCI can be realized,
might lead to a reduction in revenues from deductibles due
to more cost-conscious behavior. An option to overcome
this reduction in revenues would be to increase the
deductible amount [15].
Though the results of our empirical illustration should
be interpreted with caution, we believe the method devel-
oped in this paper to simulate the CCI can be useful to
researchers, insurers and policymakers who want to
indicate the relative effects of different cost sharing designs
on the incentives for cost-conscious behavior.
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Table 7 The CCI under a
doughnut hole with various
deductible amounts d and
various starting points s for the
full sample
d s P(Y\ s)a P(Y\ s ? d)b E(Y|Y\ s)c E(Y|Y\ s ? d)d CCI
500 0 0 0.43 0 158 68
500 0.43 0.57 158 302 104
1000 0.57 0.66 302 433 112
2257 0.75 0.79 607 709 102
5000 0.89 0.91 1059 1118 64
2000 0 0 0.73 0 551 393
500 0.43 0.77 158 658 431
1000 0.57 0.81 302 755 426
2257 0.75 0.87 607 959 365
5000 0.89 0.93 1059 1269 226
3000 0 0 0.81 0 755 598
500 0.43 0.84 158 842 621
1000 0.57 0.86 302 921 602
2257 0.75 0.90 607 1090 505
5000 0.89 0.94 1059 1348 313
5000 0 0 0.89 0 1059 920
500 0.43 0.91 158 1118 917
1000 0.57 0.92 302 1173 872
2257 0.75 0.93 607 1290 722
5000 0.89 0.96 1059 1475 451
a The probability that healthcare expenses remain below the starting point of the deductible
b The probability that healthcare expenses remain below the endpoint of the deductible
c The expected expenses given that they end up in the interval [0, s]
d The expected expenses given that they end up in the interval [0, s ? d]
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